politically, one would expect to see politicians in countries where the far-right is on the rise to be spouting similar attacks against TTIP to those that Trump has thrown at TPP and NAFTA in the name of protecting national pride.
Yet, surprisingly, this is not the case in Central Europe. Extremism is on the rise across Europe, and in many countries it is taking the form of right-wing populism. Marine Le Pen's far-right National Front party is expected to be a viable contender for the presidency in France (Bremmer, 2015; Emmott, 2014) , the far-right Freedom Party of Austria narrowly lost in May's presidential election (Bradley, 2016 ), Hungary's Viktor Orban has retained power since he was initially elected in 2010 (Woodard, 2015, p. 1) , and Poland elected its right-wing populist Law and Justice Party in 2015 (Mortensen and Cullinane, 2015) . Even in Germany, right-wing politicians and ideas are taking root as the refugee crisis continues to unfold, fueled by the widespread coverage of events such as the New Year Eve 2015 sexual assaults in Cologne of German women by immigrant men. In each of these countries, opposition to TTIP is rampant, as evidenced by statements from elected officials to demonstrations in the streets. The rise of populism coupled with the strong resistance to TTIP has caused many to speculate that illiberalism is a critical factor in opposition to free trade agreements like TTIP (Appelbaum, 2016; Krugman, 2016; Morath, 2016; Taylor, 2015) . In observing these right-wing populist governments, it is reasonable to presume that these illiberal democracies are more prone to reject TTIP.
The question this paper poses is the extent to which opposition to TTIP is directly correlated to the recent rise of right-wing populism, especially in Central Europe. We will explore this theory through case studies of three different Central European members of the EU, Hungary, Germany, and Poland, reviewing relative levels of right-wing activity in these nations and their populace's reactions to TTIP. While these countries vary significantly in terms of size and economic and political power, they share membership in the EU, a geographic region, the experience of undergoing a radical economic shock since the fall of the Communist bloc, and the recent ascendance of far-right populist parties.
Attitudes towards free trade have changed drastically as negotiations have progressed since 2013. According to a 2014 poll by Eurobarometer, the median approval rating for a trade agreement with the US at the time was 60% across the EU. Germany and Austria were least supportive of TTIP (39% favored it in both countries), and Lithuania (79% in favor) and Hungary (62% in favor) were among the most supportive nations. In late 2015, Eurobarometer conducted another EU-wide survey about attitudes towards a trade deal with the United States, the most recently available data at the time of publication. The 2015 survey noted major changes in the preceding year in the public's perceptions towards free trade agreements with the US. Specifically, across the EU, support for TTIP was at 53%, much lower than the 60% median for 2014. Apart from neutrality, Germany's opposition to TTIP alone increased 20% to 59% against TTIP, and in Hungary, support decreased from 62% to 53% (see figure 1) (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34) . This poll indicates a substantial shift in support for TTIP among the constituents of the EU which is further evidenced by statements made by governments and other news sources.
'Trumpian' Attitudes in Central Europe: A Case Study From an economic perspective, comparing the three case studies, Germany has the strongest economy, Poland the second strongest, and Hungary the weakest. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, Germany boasts a population of nearly 81 million people, Poland nearly 39 million people, and Hungary nearly 10 million people as of late 2015, the most recent survey available. In terms of economic output, Germany's 2015 GDP was $3.841 trillion, Poland's $1.005 trillion, and Hungary's $258.4 billion. The three main economic sectors for all three countries are agriculture, industry, and, most importantly, services, which accounted for over 50% of the economy in each country. Germany's exports are responsible for 46% of its economy, Poland's at 52%, and Hungary's at 93%. The 2015 unemployment rate was estimated to be at 4.8% in Germany, 10.1% in Poland, and 6.8% in Hungary (see figure 2) (CIA World Factbook, 2016) . Since Germany and Poland are closer to each other in economic size than Hungary is to either of them, we would expect a similar response to TTIP between Germany and Poland. 
Hungary
As Fareed Zakaria defined the term in 1997, an illiberal democracy is a "democratically elected regime," quite possibly "reelected or reaffirmed through referenda," which frequently rejects "constitutional limits on their power" and deprives "citizens of basic rights and freedoms." Besides Belarus, perhaps no European state better fits this definition than Hungary. Balint Magyar, the former minister of education in Hungary, recently claimed: "'Hungary has become a mafia state, like Russia. [W] hat is different between [former] Soviet countries and Hungary is that we went through a liberal democratic development first, then took a U-turn'" (Woodard, 2015, p.2) . In fact, Hungary's Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, has stated explicitly that he aspires to make Hungary "an illiberal state," like China, Turkey, Singapore, or Russia (Woodard, 2015, p.1).
Coming into power in 2010 on the heels of the global financial crisis, Orban used his political clout to rewrite the definition of democracy in Hungary. Many of the historically accepted hallmarks of democracy such as religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the ability to openly and freely elect leaders have been in Orban's crosshairs since he took office. As a result, the judiciary branch is no longer independent, the courts are packed with political loyalists, new election rules favor Orban's governing coalition, and news organizations can be heavily fined for not being "politically balanced" in the eyes of Orban's government (Woodard, 2015; Simon, 2014) . When members of the parliamentary opposition have disagreed with individual laws on homelessness, political advertising, gay marriage, religious freedom, or judicial review, Orban used his supermajority to overrule their votes, and on an occasion, to add his illiberal laws to the nation's constitution (Woodard, 2015) . In 2014, Orban targeted organizations that received aid from Norway, going so far as to accuse one of the groups of "channeling money to members of an opposition party" (Simon, 2014; Mahony, 2014) . Orban has stated that, although these changes are different from what other countries in the EU do, he is simply trying to do the best for his country after seeing that Western democracy and liberalization failed during the financial crisis (Board, 2014; Woodard, 2015; Simon, 2014) .
Over the course of the nearly six years in which Orban has held office in Hungary, he has repeatedly rebuffed criticisms of his policies and government by the EU. Orban has stated that "Hungary 'will not be a colony' and [will not] 'live according to the commands of foreign powers,'" that he will not "'function as a foreign power's viceroy in Hungary'" (Woodard 2015; Feher, 2014 ). An example of his reluctance to acquiesce to demands from foreign powers happened shortly after Orban first took office in 2010. After the 2008 financial crisis left economies around the world in disarray, Hungary faced a mounting deficit. In 2009, the European Council mandated that Hungary must reduce its national deficit to below 3% of GDP by 2011, well below the national deficit of many of the other stronger economies in the EU. By 2012, this agreement had not been reached, and the European Council released a statement that "Hungary has failed to comply with the Council's recommendation (July 2009)… in order to bring its government budget deficit below the EU's reference value of 3% of GDP" (Council of the European Union, 2012). When Hungary still failed to comply or make any lasting changes to reduce its deficit, the European Commission voted to suspend one third of the country's EU funding to try to force compliance (Guarascio, 2012) . Hungary responded to this perceived attack by pointing out that, since its deficit was still among Europe's lowest, it was undeserving of the sanctions (Eurostat, 2015; Guarascio, 2012) . These arguments fell on deaf ears, however, and Hungary was forced to turn to international financial markets outside of the EU to meet the EU's standards. At the same time, it flouted the EU's authority via short-term budget cuts as opposed to sustainable long-term measures (Carney, 2012; Guarascio, 2012; CIA World Factbook, 2016) .
Considering this history, it is important to remember that TTIP is an EU-sponsored trade agreement, one designed to improve relations between the EU and the US and foster free trade between the two largest economies in the world. TTIP is therefore a symbol of increased liberalism and greater integration-in short, everything against which Orban is fighting (Traub, 2015) . Orban aspires to protect Hungary's national sovereignty as an illiberal democracy and has stated that he "cannot support an agreement [such as TTIP] that… results in Hungary relinquishing any part of its sovereignty" (Szakacs, 2015) . This attitude mainly stems from the removal of Hungary's sovereignty to an international body that 'Trumpian' Attitudes in Central Europe: A Case Study makes decisions without protecting Hungary's best interests, both in terms of trade tariffs and quotas as well as an international court system. Moreover, playing by international rules flies directly in the face of what Orban has tried to establish and historically what he has done. In 2015 Eleni Kounalakis, the US ambassador for Hungary during the first three years of Orban's regime, noted that, "a single company controlled by a close ally and former college roommate of Orban's, Közgép, had won $1.3 billion in government contracts in the first two years of his administration" (Woodard, 2015) . The implications of this are that "international companies located in Hungary that ordinarily would have bid for the projects told us it was no longer worth the time and money required to submit proposals, because Közgép was sure to win" (Woodard, 2015) . International free trade agreements, including TTIP, would compel Hungary to liberate its market and change the political policies that it has already changed.
Behind the vitriol and vehement opposition to TTIP is almost exclusively the Hungarian government. Indeed, in the same Eurobarometer poll in late 2015, Hungarians supported TTIP by 53%, lower than the 62% by which they had supported TTIP in 2014 but still overwhelmingly supportive of TTIP, especially when compared to other countries in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34) . This level of support among the people does not match the criticisms and hidebound declarations of the Hungarian government. It is worth noting that since Orban has been able to change the Hungarian constitution in ways that make it extremely difficult for his party to be removed from power, his government is not as obligated to acquiesce to the will of the people as other, more democratic countries such as Germany.
However, illiberalism is not the only explanation, nor the most compelling for the Hungarian leadership's opposition to TTIP. Some of Hungary's main concerns with TTIP are its potential impact on Hungarian sovereignty. Until World War I, Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where most of the power resided in Austria; after World War II (WWII), Hungary became a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Hungary's puppet communist regime fell in 1989, and ever since it has been fiercely protective of its independence (Donovan, 2012) . Orban has made countless statements since taking power vowing to defend Hungary's sovereignty from the manipulation of and corruption by foreign powers and foreign companies (Szakacs, 2015; Hungary will not, 2015) . This could be because of a desire to protect his illiberal policies, but it could also be Hungarian national pride, as the last two decades are the first two decades in over a century in which Hungary has experienced actual sovereignty.
Furthermore, Hungary's economy is built around the service sectors (65%), manufacturing (31%), and agriculture (4%) (CIA, 2016) . Despite agriculture's relatively small role, in 2015 Hungary passed a law prohibiting the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) within its borders and has made numerous statements calling for the protection of the agricultural industry, further emphasizing its outsized importance in Hungary's economy (Sarmadi, 2015; House Speaker, 2015; Hungarian Government, 2015) . Although agriculture only makes up a small portion of Hungary's economy, it constitutes a large portion of Hungary's cultural identity. According to the CIA World Factbook, agriculture in 2015 constituted 4.4% of the Hungarian economy (CIA World Factbook, 2016 ). Yet prior to joining the EU, agriculture was a much more dominant industry in Hungary. In fact, between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1994 and when Hungary announced it was joining the EU in 2003, agriculture hovered around 6.7%. Since joining the EU, the impact of http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/2 Hungary's agricultural sector on GDP has dropped to average 4.3%, an impact that is still lamented across Hungary (World Bank, 2016) .
Before WWII, Hungary's economy was mostly agricultural, but that all changed when the Soviet Union took over in the late 1940s. As part of the communist policies implemented across the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the time, a forced industrialization took place in Hungary, shifting those employed in agriculture from "more than half to about one-eighth by the 1990s" . Because industrialization was foisted upon Hungary by the Soviet Union, many Hungarians still choose to identify with the agricultural identity of previous centuries. As such, Hungary's leadership has made several statements arguing for the protection of small-and medium-size businesses and for the protection of its agricultural sector, both of which are critical components of its cultural identity (House Speaker, 2015; Sarmadi, 2016; Szijjártó, 2015) . A free trade agreement, despite the countless statements of the EU stating otherwise, raises concerns that Hungary would have to bring back GMOs or adopt a policy or law that would adversely affect its agricultural industry and therefore impact its cultural identity. Ceding power and interests to an international body would not only jeopardize Hungary's cultural identity, but also would relinquish some of its sovereignty. Both of these outcomes are reasonable justifications for opposing TTIP.
Germany
In contrast to Hungary, Germany is not run by a far-right populist, nor does its current coalition government have particularly illiberal democratic policies. However, the largely transparent and constitution-observing nation has voiced strong opposition to the trade deal. On the one hand, the head of the German government, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and her CDU party are nominally in favor of TTIP. On the other hand, different offices of the German government, including the judicial branch of the government, do not share the same excitement (TTIP trade talks, 2016). Additionally, other political parties have doubts about TTIP. Both Kathrin Oertel, the former leader of the anti-Islamic far-right populist movement Pegida, (Ex-Pegida, 2016) , and the rising far-right party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD) have recently expressed their opposition to the trade deal. These far-right leaders share the sentiments of much of the German population that has been very outspoken about its resistance towards the proposed deal (Eurobarometer, 2015, p. 34) . In this respect, Germany's opposition to TTIP seems contrary to that of Hungary's, as its opposition is not being led by its head of government. Thus, Germany seems to provide an interesting counter to the theory that resistance to TTIP is inherently linked to illiberal democracies.
There are few nations on either side of the Atlantic, where the reaction towards TTIP has been as negative as Germany. Germany, alongside Austria, Luxembourg and Slovenia, is the only where the citizens against TTIP outnumber those in favor (Rehn, 2016) . German EU negotiators and the EU parliamentarians have been some of the most outspoken in opposing TTIP (Vincenti, 2015) . The fears expressed both by the Germany's far-right and the German population are varied, but there are two aspect that often dominate the anti-TTIP rhetoric.
First, the existence of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in TTIP. ISDS is an option that exists within an international trade deal that is available to foreign corporations allowing them to sue national governments for losses on investment if a country's laws have 'Trumpian' Attitudes in Central Europe: A Case Study a negative effect on investment. ISDS is in roughly 2,700 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) worldwide including NAFTA (Farrell, 2015) . Ironically, Germany, the first country to form investor protection through the development of investor-state dispute system, now houses some of its greatest critics. To address their concerns, the European Commission proposed a new form of regulating conflicts between state and foreign investors within TTIP, the investor court system (ICS). Though the proposed ICS promises to be more accessible to small-and medium-sized businesses and to be more transparent than ISDS, the German Magistrates Association (a professional organization of judges and public prosecutors) still claims that "the ICS represents a threat to the sovereignty of legal systems already in place in Europe," and that "they put little faith in the EU's ability to manage it" (Knight, 2016) . This criticism of the German government mirrors the concerns of its people that the power allotted American private investors to sue national governments in an unelected court is too great, too dangerous, and an infringement of sovereignty.
Second, the "closed door" nature of the negotiations, has made many Germans view the whole proposal as a "Trojan horse," as there has been little to no access given to the media or public (Durden, 2016) . This aspect of TTIP has been, in addition to ISDS, one of the most concerning to Germans-who are wary of any secrecy involving business and/ or government. The caution goes beyond the thousands who have protested against the "big veil of secrecy" to public officials (Durden, 2016) . Norbert Lammert, the President of the German Bundestag and member of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands or CDU) party, has also expressed reservation regarding the secret trade talks, which even national parliaments have been unable to access. In October 2015 he threatened to vote against TTIP in the Bundestag demanding that trade negotiations "should be accessible to all EU member states, governments and parliaments" (Germany Calls for More TTIP Transparency, 2015). To try and address this concern about TTIP negotiation Germany's Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel created a TTIP "reading room," in which German parliamentarians are allowed limited access to TTIP negotiation documents (Von Hein, 2016) . However the reading room, much like the ICS as an answer to ISDS, has not been seen as an acceptable answer to the problem. The overregulation of the room, with bans on cell phone, laptops, and copying, has caused critics in Germany to call the room "laughable" (Pinzler, 2016) . As both these issues, ISDS and closed-door negotiations, remain unresolved in the eyes of many in Germany, frustration has grown and a political opportunity has presented itself.
In October 2015 hundreds of thousands of German citizens gathered in the German capitol, Berlin, for an anti-TTIP protest (Johnston, 2015) . Only six months later, President Obama was greeted with 35,000 anti-TTIP demonstrators in Hanover on his visit to the CEBIT international trade fair (Eckardt, 2016) . In the wake of such protests, anti-TTIP found an institutional home in the far-right Alternative for Germany party (AfD). AfD is part of the populist movement in Germany that has taken an anti-refugee stance as the European refugee crisis has unfolded. Though the party originally took a neutral approach to TTIP, its stance on TTIP has recently soured to attract Germans belonging to the anti-TTIP wave. In March 2016 the AfD saw its power in German politics soar as it won 24%, 13%, and 15% of the votes in three state elections (German state elections, 2016) , thus surpassing the 5% threshold required by German law for a party to gain seats in the parliament. After this great showing for the up-and-coming party, AfD deputy spokesperson Alexander Gauland and chairwoman Frauke Petry announced for the first time their party's official ophttp://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/2 position to the trade deal (Sagener, 2016) . With this official stance coming only recently, it would seem that this move by this far-right party is an attempt to score political points with angry constituents and not a move deeply rooted in the party's convictions.
In short, the AfD exemplifies the general pattern of the German anti-TTIP movement being more organic than party-based. Far from the wellspring of anti-TTIP sentiment, German far-right parties have adopted anti-TTIP rhetoric to pander to opponents of free trade.
Poland
Like Hungary, Poland's far-right rhetoric comes more from its elected officials than grassroots movements. In many instances, Poland is following Hungary's path down the far right. Upon election in November 2015 (which was won by a landslide), the Polish Law and Justice controlled both the legislative and executive branches, a first in Polish history. The party wasted no time in getting started with its agenda-in just a few months, it has passed laws constraining the media, tried to install its judges on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (akin to the US Supreme Court) and has tried to rewrite the rules so as to prevent the Tribunal from exercising its ability to quickly veto legislation (Rettman, 2015 , Sobczyk, 2016 , EurActiv, 2016 . Although the actual president of Poland is Andrzej Duda and the Prime Minister Beata Szydlo, the true leader pulling the strings is the vocal Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Law and Justice party leader , The king of Poland, Davies, 2016) . Kaczynski has stated on more than one occasion that he admires the illiberal democracy in Hungary and wishes to emulate it in Poland by building "Budapest in Warsaw" (Smolar, 2016 , On the naughty step, 2016). His party's moves to curb the independence of the media and control the courts are definitely reminiscent of what Orban has done in Hungary since taking power.
Yet given the far-right political gains from Poland's leadership, it is surprising that Poland would still support TTIP as strongly as it does. Public opinion polls aside, even the statements from the government in Poland focus more on Russia, Germany, and immigration than anti-trade and anti-TTIP rhetoric (On the naughty step, 2016 , Politico, 2016 , Gessen, 2016 . Indeed, when TTIP is mentioned in Polish media at all, the general tone of the statements is optimistic colored with caution (Ministry of Treasury, 2015 , Maciejasz, 2015 , Ministry of Foreign, 2014 , in stark contrast to the vitriol from Hungary's and Germany's political parties. Furthermore, Poland's main concerns right now appear to be pushing Kaczynski's populist agenda through parliament and as far as it will go, rather than blocking TTIP. Whereas Hungary's leadership has been quite outspoken in both opposition to TTIP and furthering its own agenda, Poland's main sticking points are the tribunal, Russia, and not kowtowing to German demands , PiS partisans, On the naughty step, 2016 , Rettman, 2015 .
The reasons for why Poland's attitude about TTIP is so surprisingly different from Hungary and Germany are varied and strongly embedded in Europe's past. Unlike Hungary, Poland was first invaded by Germany during World War II and then later partly annexed by the Soviet Union. As such, its recent political dynamic is rife with strong nationalism and calls for independence, especially from Germany. As both Germany and Brussels have called for Kaczynski and the Law and Justice Party to stop, anti-German sentiment has swept the nation. In the media, a magazine published a picture of Angela Merkel as Adolf Hitler, captioned "again they want to supervise Poland;" in the government, the German ambassador was summoned to the foreign minister's office for "anti-Polish" comments from German 'Trumpian' Attitudes in Central Europe: A Case Study politicians and a German EU commissioner was scolded in official Polish-EU correspondence for suggesting that Germans overseeing Poland carried the "worst possible connotations" among Poles (On the naughty step, 2016 .
Like Germany, Poland is a strong economic power in the EU, and like both Hungary and Germany, Poland looks forward to further strengthening ties with the USA through increased trade and a stronger military presence in Warsaw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Sobczyk, 2016 ). Yet what motivates Poland to strengthen its ties with the USA differs slightly from Hungary's motivations and Germany's. Poland has long had a rocky history with Russia. This history stems both from the tragedies and atrocities committed during WWII and from being a satellite state of the Soviet Union for nearly half a century. It is further exacerbated by the fact that in 2010, 96 members of the Polish elite, including the entire army command and president, died in a plane crash in Russia (Gessen, 2016 , Davies, 2016 , The German test, 2015 . This event has left many Poles, including Kaczynski, whose twin brother Lech was the president at the time, suspicious of Russia and convinced that the plane crash was not an accident (Davies, 2016 , Gessen, 2016 . Indeed, for many Poles, the Law and Justice party is more than just a far-right party--it is the antiPutin party. As Russia begins to bristle at Poland by trying to compel Poland to acquiesce to its demands (Gessen, 2016) , Poland is seeking help from America to be able to stand strong against Russia. These escalating tensions could also be driving Poland to strengthen its relations with the US in every way possible-but especially through free trade and TTIP (Sobczyk, 2016 , Gessen, 2016 .
Conclusions
Marine Le Pen, the French populist National Front's leader and potential presidential candidate, has stated that "one of her goals [as president] would be to unite with the parties on the left to block [TTIP]" (Emmott, 2014) . This statement is exemplary of the case made by economists and journalists that illiberalism is a critical factor in the opposition of TTIP in the EU. While it would obviously be beneficial to widen this study to more countries cases, the German, Polish, and Hungarian cases adequately show that, while illiberalism definitely colors opposition to TTIP, it is not necessarily a precondition for anti-free-trade movements in Europe. A number of prominent voices have made facile links between opposition to TTIP and the rise of the political far right, but these claims do not hold upon further examination. All of these countries experienced similar economic shocks and similar political histories as part of the controlled economy of the Soviet Union.
Yet the rationale behind the opposition of TTIP is not as uniform as one would expect given these backgrounds. Even the main source of the opposition is different between the three countries. In Hungary, 53% of the population still supports TTIP, while the majority of anti-TTIP sentiment is spouted by the illiberal political leadership (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34) . In Germany, however, the ruling party is supportive of TTIP, whereas an overwhelming majority of German constituents ardently opposes it. In Poland, the far-right government has stayed relatively silent compared to its neighbors on the subject of TTIP, and when it is mentioned at all, it is mentioned in cautiously optimistic tones-the opposite of leadership in Hungary. Its people are still some of the most supportive of TTIP in the entire EU, at 73% in 2014 and only slightly decreasing as of late 2015, thereby flouting the perception that a far-right movement must be at odds with either its government, as in Germany, or its people, as in Hungary (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34). The Populist Party, Alternative http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/2 for Germany, has only recently adopted an anti-TTIP stance in an attempt to appeal to the German population's fears of the deal. In Hungary, however, Orban has repeatedly rebuffed stronger ties with the US and the EU, including free trade, since he took office in 2010, whereas the majority of Hungarians still support increased trade with the US. In observing these two countries' opposition to TTIP, it becomes readily apparent that while that opposition exists in both countries, the source of that opposition-from the government or from the people-differs. Indeed, this variety of sources of opposition is mirrored in the USA, where the anti-trade rhetoric during the 2016 presidential race has been spouted by both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, two individuals whose principles and policies could not be more different. Their coalition of anti-trade opinions has been deemed the "unholy alliance" (Paul, 2016) . Moreover, Germany, Poland, and Hungary have other concerns that could better predict their reactions to TTIP, including sovereignty, agriculture and GMOs, transparency, and legality of the trade agreement. The global ramifications for TTIP include setting a precedent for other trade agreements in the future across the world. Moving forward, it is critical that we dispatch with the current analysis of the European situation with TTIP, looking forward to future trade deals with a careful consideration to avoid thinking of the EU as a totality instead of an enormously diverse place.
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